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Throughout history, nations have regulated
communications industries to varying degrees in
pursuit of policy goals that are deemed unachiev-
able without government intervention. Tradition-
ally, government intervention has occurred in an
environment that permitted-or, some might ar-
gue, necessitated-the development of regulatory
frameworks that relied on monopoly providers
and imposed rules that differed substantially with
the type of communications technology. In recent
years, circumstances have changed dramatically.
Policymakers are actively seeking to encourage
competition and implement deregulatory policies
in many industries of traditionally heavily-regu-
lated monopoly providers. Furthermore, what
have traditionally been economically distinct com-
munications markets are converging into a com-
mon market because of advancements in commu-
nications technology. These developments are in-
creasing the complexity of developing, evaluating
and implementing appropriate government inter-
ventions in communications markets. The conse-
quence of these developments are thus three-fold:
the risks of adverse unintended consequences of
government interventions rise; the costs caused by
such consequences increase; and the ability to im-
plement timely corrections is constrained.
This article asserts that "essentiality of access"-
that is, the historical alignment of access (to an
essential service or facility) problems to legal prin-
ciples-should be used as an organizing principle
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for examining many of the future policy objec-
tives in the communications industry in order to
better enable the adoption of appropriate govern-
ment interventions. Policy problems that have
consistently been handled by distinct legal rules
for each distinct technology, must now be ad-
dressed simultaneously across competing technol-
ogy platforms. In this article, "essentiality of ac-
cess" is applied to debates regarding broadband
policy in the United States, as broadband access
issues entail legal complexities that serve as a use-
ful microcosm of this convergence of legal para-
digms in the communications industry.
Using "essentiality of access" as a focal point,
this article demonstrates that differing types of ac-
cess objectives based on viewing broadband as an
essential service or facility require reference to
distinctive legal principles. By juxtaposing differ-
ing access problems and legal principles, this pa-
per explains how the pursuit of broadband policy
objectives will require recognition of the differing
relationships of access recipients to the access
providers-as end user customer, competitor,
speaker or audience member-that at times con-
flict and require policymakers to choose certain
interests over others. This legal reality makes the
selection of broadband policy objectives and asso-
ciated government interventions a tremendously
complex endeavor.
In making broadband policy decisions, how-
ever, this article shows that there is an even more
fundamental challenge for policymakers and the
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courts. When balancing the competing interests
of access recipients and access providers, the con-
stitutionality of broadband policy choices may de-
pend on characteristics of broadband providers
that are unique to the corporate form. The legal
rights and duties of individuals and corporations
are not synonymous under United States law, al-
though the distinction is perhaps less obvious in
recent times given the prevalence of the corpo-
rate form throughout the twentieth century. The
courts will ultimately need to clarify the principles
for determining the rights of broadband corpora-
tions under the United States Constitution in or-
der to address the constitutional challenges that
new broadband policies will likely engender.
Section II of this article describes how "essen-
tiality of access" can be used as an organizing
principle. Section III briefly describes the diversity
of perceived benefitg from widespread broadband
deployment, and the breadth of the correspond-
ing demands for government intervention. Sec-
tion III also stresses the complexity of developing
broadband policy because of obvious legal, eco-
nomic and political constraints on government ac-
tion. Section IV identifies the important legal
principles that evolved in the United States in re-
sponse to various types of access problems regard-
ing an essential service or facility. The historical
development and meaning of each legal principle
is provided, with the discussion organized accord-
ing to the type of affected rights-economic, wel-
fare or free speech. Section V identifies broad-
baild access issues in terms of the type of access
problem posed and the legal rights affected. As-
suming that the relevant aspect of broadband ac-
cess is an essential service or facility, and the cir-
cumstances require government intervention, it
then identifies the associated legal principles dis-
cussed in Section IV, and describes how differing
principles and rights may be in conflict. Section
VI discusses why the pursuit of broadband policy
objectives will require policy makers and the
I The legal principles include common carrier and pub-
lic utility obligations, "business affected with a public inter-
est," the essential facilities doctrine, universal service and free
speech rights. See infra Section IV and Table 1.
2 It is important to use the historically developed legal
principles for several reasons. First, many of the broadband
access issues stem from long-recognized economic or societal
problems that the legal system has had to address in other
contexts and for which specific legal principles have already
courts to explicitly consider and clarify the differ-
ing rights of natural persons and corporations.
II. "ESSENTIALITY OF ACCESS" AS AN
ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE
In the United States, there are various contexts
in which concerns of access to some essential ser-
vice or facility have arisen and for which legal
principles have been developed. As discussed in
Section III, problems of access to an essential ser-
vice or facility differ based on the following set of
characteristics: what services or facilities are
deemed to be essential; for whom (access recipi-
ent) they are deemed to be essential; the nature
of the relationship between the access recipient
and the access provider; and what circumstances
are impeding the accessibility of the service or fa-
cility. Furthermore, specific legal principles' have
developed, both under the common law and in
statutes, to address access issues bearing similar
characteristics.
The mapping of access situations sharing simi-
lar characteristics next to the legal principles ap-
plied to them can be a valuable tool for determin-
ing the appropriate course of government inter-
vention for future "access to essential service or
facilities" problems.2
Using an access problem-to-legal principle ty-
pology for purposes of evaluating broadband ac-
cess issues is what is meant in this article by apply-
ing "essentiality of access" as an organizing princi-
ple. More specifically, each broadband access ob-
jective is first analyzed in terms of the specific form of
access deemed to be essential-to whom, from whom,
and for what purpose-and the underlying problems
or obstacles impeding that access. Next, existing legal
principles addressing previous access problems
with similar characteristics are identified and eval-
uated for their suitability to address the broad-
band access issue.
In terms of determining whether government
intervention is necessary, it is important to recog-
been established. Second, awareness of these preexisting
principles is not only insightful of prior experience but is
often necessary to address legal constraints on transitioning
from preexisting regimes. Third, trends underlying the de-
velopment of existing legal principles reveal a more funda-
mental legal problem unresolved by the courts-the scope of
corporations' constitutional rights-that will affect judicial
enforcement of agency or legislative interventions to achieve
broadband objectives.
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nize that different legal principles affect different
types of legal rights. In particular, the legal princi-
ples that are relevant here affect economic rights,
welfare-related rights or free speech rights. Aware-
ness of the types of rights that are affected-both
rights of the access recipient and of the access
provider-is necessary for determining whether
there may be conflicts of different rights when si-
multaneously pursuing multiple access objectives,
as well as the options available for resolving them.
For example, some rights may have greater consti-
tutional protections than others, thereby limiting
legislative prerogative for choosing among constit-
uent interests. In this regard, the distinction in
constitutional rights of individuals, as opposed to
corporations, may be critical.
III. THE COMPLEXITY OF BROADBAND
POLICY
Recent policy debates affecting the communica-
tions industry have focused on encouraging the
widespread deployment of broadband technol-
ogy. In this context, broadband refers to a techni-
cal "capability that enables users to originate and
receive high-quality voice, data, graphics, and
video telecommunications using any technol-
ogy."3 The perceived benefits of broadband de-
ployment are vast and diverse, as noted by Federal
Communication Commission Chairman Michael
Powell:
The widespread deployment of broadband infrastruc-
ture has become the central communications policy ob-
jective today. It is widely believed that ubiquitous broad-
" Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §157(c)
(2001). See also FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell, Remarks at
the National Summit on Broadband Deployment, Washing-
ton D.C. (Oct. 25, 2001), at http://www.fcc.gov.
4 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission,
Digital Broadband Migration Part 1I, at http://www.fcc.gov/
Speeches/Powell/200l /spmkpl 09.html (Oct. 23, 2001).
5 See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WHITE PAPER, No
COMPETITION: How MONOPOLY CONTROL OF THE BROADBAND
INTERNET THRFATENS FREE SPEECH, at http://www.aclu.org/
issues/cyber/broadband-report.pdf (2002) (the ACLU re-
port is supported by a study that it commissioned, jointly with
the Center of Digital Democracy, to Columbia Telecommuni-
cations Corporation regarding the technical prospects for
maintaining the Internet's open nature as it makes the shift
from dial-up to cable).
6 See generally STEPHEN POCIASK, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTI-
TUTE, PUTTING BROADBAND ON HIGH SPEED: NEW PUBLIC POLI-
CIES TO ENCOURAGE RAPID DEPLOYMENT (2002).
7 See 47 U.S.C. §254(h) (1) (B) (2001) (requiring that cer-
tain educational institutions be given discounts, which are
often referred to as the "e-rate," for the purchase of telecom-
band deployment will bring valuable new services to
consumers, stimulate economic activity, improve na-
tional productivity, and advance many other worthy
objectives-such as improving education, and advanc-
ing economic opportunity for more Americans. We
share much of this view and intend to do our part in
advancing reasonable and timely deployment.
4
Reports, studies and proposed legislation re-
lated to broadband also reflect this diversity in al-
leged benefits and, consequently, call for varying
and distinctly different forms of government in-
tervention. For example, the ACLU advocates that
regulators mandate open access of cable systems
to Internet Service Providers ("ISP"s) because In-
ternet access makes available to citizens a form of
speech and self-expression that is perhaps the
closest thing ever invented to a true free market
of ideas. 5 The Economic Policy Institute proposes
adopting a model of symmetric intermodal regu-
lation for digital subscriber line ("DSL") services
and cable modem services to foster private sector
investment in broadband infrastructure. They ar-
gue that this would allow private investors to reap
the benefits of improved business productivity,
greater consumer prosperity and economic
growth. 6 The Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights Education Fund and the Benton Founda-
tion urge the federal government to continue
funding for the e-rate,7 the Technology Opportu-
nities Program" and the Community Technology
Centers Program,9 in order to narrow gaps in ac-
cess to computers and the Internet. These gaps
generally arise from a digital divide based on in-
come, race and ethnicity, geography and disabil-
ity."' Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) plans to
munications services, funded through contributions assessed
against telecommunications service providers). See also 47
C.F.R. §§54.400-520 (2001) (implementing universal service
funding for schools and libraries pursuant to §254).
8 See Bringing a Nation Online, infra note 10, at 13-16 (ex-
plaining that the Technology Opportunities Program was ini-
tiated in 1994 by the United States Department of Com-
merce's National Telecommunications and Information Ad-
ministration to provide matching grants to nonprofit organi-
zations in order to promote widespread availability and use
of digital network technologies in the public and non-profit
sectors).
9 Id. at 16-17 (noting that the Community Technology
Centers Program was established in 1999 by the Department
of Education to "promote the development of model pro-
grams that demonstrate the educational effectiveness of tech-
nology in urban and rural areas and economically distress
communities").
10 See Press Release, Civil Rights.org, New Report Con-
cludes Federal Programs Critical to Bringing Nation Online,
at http://www.civilrights.org/issues/commtinication/details.
cfm?id=9456 (July 11, 2002) (the report was written by Leslie
2003]
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introduce a series of legislative initiatives, includ-
ing an FCC regulatory plan, tax incentives, gov-
ernment support for research on advanced infra-
structure technology and government use of e-
commerce broadband applications in an effort to
achieve major economic growth and productivity
gains in the United States by making affordable
broadband Internet connections available to
American homes, schools and small businesses. I
As these examples illustrate, the type of govern-
ment intervention deemed likely to encourage
the deployment of broadband technology de-
pends on the perception of the desired benefits to
be reaped, as well as the remedies necessary to
overcome the obstacles in achieving them. Thus,
simply stating that one supports government in-
tervention to encourage widespread deployment
of broadband infrastructure is hopelessly vague.
Rather, development of broadband policy re-
quires a clear articulation of the purposes for
which government intervention is being sought,
and an assessment of how that intervention
should be designed to accomplish those goals.
The complexity of developing broadband pol-
icy is further complicated by the difficulties in
transitioning from preexisting regulatory regimes
that vary with historically distinct communications
technologies. Some changes in government policy
may pose legal or economic-not to mention po-
litical-problems that undermine the sus-
tainability of achieving the desired policy objec-
tives over time. Failure to adequately anticipate
and address these problems, as extensively dis-
cussed by the author in prior work,' 2 will likely in-
crease the risk of adverse, unintended conse-
quences brought about by government action or
Harris & Associates for the Digital Media Forum, a project of
the Ford Foundation) [hereinafter Bringing a Nation Online].
II Memorandum from the Office of Senator Joseph I.
Lieberman, Broadband: A 21st Century Technology and Pro-
ductivity Strategy, at http://www.senate.gov/-lieberman/
press/02/050broadband.pdf (May 28, 2002).
12 See generally Barbara A. Cherry, Filling the Political Feasi-
bility and Economic Viability Cap to Achieve Sustainable Telecom-
munications Policies (presented at the Sixth Asia Pacific Re-
gional Conference of the International Telecommunications
Society, Kowloon, Hong Kong), at http://www.its200l.ust.
hk/program.html (July 7, 2001) (providing a framework to
satisfy both political feasibility and economic viability con-
straints in designing policies affecting a nation's telecommu-
nications infrastructure); Barbara A. Cherry & Steven S.
Wildman, Preventing Flawed Communication Policies by Address-
ing Constitutional Principles, 2000 L. REV. Mmiir. ST. U. DET.
C.L. 55 (2002) (providing a framework for addressing the
constitutional and economic problems that limit options for
inaction. It could also hinder the ability to imple-
ment timely corrections.
IV. LEGAL PRINCIPLES MANDATING
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL SERVICES OR
FACILITIES
This section first provides an overview of signifi-
cant legal principles that have developed in re-
sponse to different problems regarding access to
some essential service or facility. Subsection A re-
views the underlying sources of governmental
power on which these legal principles are based.
Subsections B through D review the meaning of
these legal principles and the historical reasons
underlying their development. The discussions in
Subsections B through D are organized to address
legal principles affecting economic rights, welfare
rights and free speech rights, respectively. The
background provided throughout this section is
necessary for evaluating the application of legal
principles to broadband access problems in Sec-
tion V, and for understanding the need to con-
sider and clarify the differing constitutional rights
of individuals and corporations in Section VI.
The following table (Table 1) provides an over-
view of important legal principles that have devel-
oped in the United States to address various ac-
cess problems with regard to an essential service
or facility. The table first describes the access
problem-for what reason access is deemed nec-
essary, the relationship of the access recipient to
the access provider, and the nature of the under-
lying problem or purpose to be addressed-and
then the legal principle and associated obligations
of the access provider that developed to address
modifying communication policies in response to new tech-
nologies and deregulatory philosophy) [hereinafter Cherry
& Wildman 2(00]; Barbara A. Cherry & Steven S. Wildman,
Institutional Endowment as Foundation for Regulatory Performance
and Regime Transitions: The Role of the US Constitution in Tele-
communications Regulation in the United States, 23 TELECOMMU-
NICAIONS POLICY 607-23 (1999), at http://www.tpeditor.
com/tponline.htm (Oct. 1999) (analyzing the relationship of
constitutional principles to economic efficiency goals, with
application to recovery of stranded costs) [hereinafter
Cherry & Wildman 1999]; Barbara A. Cherry & Steven S.
Wildman, Unilateral and Bilateral Rales: A Framework for Increas-
ing Competition While Meeting Universal Service Goals in Telecom-
munications, in MAKING UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICY: ENIIANC-
ING. TIHE PROCESS THROUGH. MULTIDISCIPLINARY EVALUNFION
(Barbara A. Cherry, Steven S. Wildman, & A. Hammond,
eds., 1999) (1999) [hereinafter Unilateral and Bilateral Rules]
(analyzing legal and economic problems of pursuing univer-
sal service goals in a market without legal monopolies).
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Table 1: Legal Principles to Address Different Access Problems
Regarding Essential Services or Facilities
Relationship of
Access is Needed Access Recipient to Underlying Purpose Obligations of
to Sustain What Access Provider or Problem Legal Principle(s) Access Provider
Provision of essential Customer as endusers. Economic coercion; Common carrier; pub- Provide access to
service, not adequately dependence of cus- lic utility; business essential service with-
supplied in a competi- tomer requires protec- affected with a public out discrimination, at
tive market, through- tion. interest, reasonable rates, and
out the community. with adequate skill
and care.
Viable competition in Competitors. Economic characteris- Prohibit refusal to Provide access to
a related market of a tics of supply require deal with competitors essential facility
monopolist, access to monopolist's (e.g. essential facilities (input) under reason-
essential facilities. doctrine), able prices, terms and
conditions.
Equality of access to Targeted customers as High cost of providing Universal service as a Contribute funds to
essential services. endusers. service; indigence of form of welfare bene- and/or provide subsi-
customers, fit. dized essential ser-
vices.
Legitimacy of, and citi- Speaker as enduser or Viewpoint diversity Free speech rights. Provide access to
zen's participation in, competitor (for bene- and channel pro- channel of communi-
democracy. fit of audience). vider's potential cation.
refusal to deal with
speaker.
that problem. The first two rows of Table 1 de-
scribe legal principles related to economic rights,
the third row to welfare-related rights and the last
row to free speech rights.1"
A. Sources of Governmental Powers
The Tenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution14 clearly establishes that powers not
granted to the federal government are reserved to
the states.15 So while the federal government has
the exclusive power to regulate interstate com-
merce, the states retain the power to regulate in-
trastate commerce.' 6 In addition, state powers in-
clude inherent powers of the sovereign that have
their origin under English common law. 17 These
inherent powers include police power, franchis-
ing and the creation of corporations.' 8 The legal
13 The classification of rights is apparent from the con-
tent of the second and third columns.
14 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
15 The Tenth Amendment provides: "[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respec-
tively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
16 Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution
provides that Congress shall have the power to regulate com-
merce among the States. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
principles in Table 1 can be traced, in large part,
to the exercise of these powers.
The police power is the power to legislate for
the common welfare.1 The police power is the
basis of broad regulatory authority that state legis-
latures have exercised to implement a wide array
of policy objectives, such as those affecting eco-
nomic, welfare, and free speech rights as dis-
cussed in Sections B through D. However, a
State's exercise of the police power is limited by
the provisions of the United States Constitution,
enforceable upon judicial review by the courts. As
discussed in Subsection B.4, judicial interpreta-
tion of the permissible scope of a State's police
power has played an important role in shaping
the economic regulation of "essential services" in
the United States.
State governments also have the inherent au-
17 Each state also has its own constitution that allocates
power among the legislative, executive and judicial branches,
and may place limitations on the state legislature's inherent
powers. However, state constitutional limitations are not ex-
plored in this article.
18 See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
19 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH
AND CIIEFJUSTICE SHAW, 229-265 (1957) (discussing the his-




thority to delegate certain powers to private indi-
viduals for the purpose of benefiting the public.
Such a delegation of power is referred to as the
granting of a franchise.2~1 As discussed in Subsec-
tion B.1, the franchise power has been used ex-
tensively in the United States to enable the wide-
spread deployment of infrastructures by private
entities, such as railroads and public utilities that
are deemed to be essential.
State governments also have the power to cre-
ate corporations.21 Based on the traditional mean-
ing of this power under English common law, a
corporation was considered a quasi-governmental
body-that is, a private government holding dele-
gated public authority-that was self-governing
and could hold property.22 A special legislative act
was required to grant a charter for a corporation,
and the corporation's activities were limited to
what was specified in the charter. By the seven-
teenth century, some corporations charters were
granted to establish enterprises created to make
profits for its stockholders.23 However, it was not
until the nineteenth century that general incorpo-
ration statutes were gradually enacted by the
states to eliminate the need for special legislative
acts to grant charters and to permit private per-
sons to create corporations.2 4 As described in Sub-
sections B.2 and B.3, these general incorporation
statutes gave rise to economic abuses that the In-
terstate Commerce Act2 5 and the Sherman Anti-
trust Act 2' were enacted to address.
20 Franchises were required to permit private individuals
to charge tolls or fees for the use of facilities they built, such
as bridges, ferries, aqueducts, and canals. Franchises could
also be used to delegate to private parties the governmental
authority-such as eminent domain-that was necessary to
exercise their functions uinder the franchise.]. HUGHFS, THE
GOVERNMENT HABrr REDUX 37-43, 103-05 (1991) (discussing
franchising powers). See generally Sallyanne Payton, The Duty
oJ a Public Utility to Serve in the Presence of New Competition, in
APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIc PRINCIPLES IN PUBLIC UTrILrrY IN-
DUSTRIES 121-52 (Werner Sichel & Thomas G. Gies eds.,
1981) (discussing the historical derivations of the delegation
of power to private individuals and how this special service
obligation is currently bestowed on common carriers and
public utility companies) [hereinafter Payton].
21 See Andrew L. Creighton, The Emergence of Incorpo-
ration as a Legal Form for Organization (1990) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with this au-
thor) (discussing the development of the corporation) [here-
inafter Creighton]; Payton, supra note 20 at 135-36 (discuss-
ing the development of the corporation).
22 See Creighton, supra note 21, at 34-39. See generally
JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORA-
B. Access Issues Affecting Economic Rights
The legal principles affecting economic rights
in Table 1 address evolving concepts of economic
coercion for which government intervention has
been deemed necessary for the purpose of provid-
ing access to an essential service or facility. The
legal principles that relate to economic coercion
of customers (as end users) are based on: the law
of common carriers and public utilities; the codifi-
cation of common carrier regulation .of railroads
in the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA") of 1887;
and the state's power to regulate "businesses af-
fected with a public interest." The legal principles
related to economic coercion affecting competi-
tors is the essential facilities doctrine, a doctrine
that has evolved from judicial interpretation of
the Sherman Act in 1890 and related cases ad-
dressing refusals to deal.2 7 Furthermore, a com-
mon thread running throughout the evolution of
these legal principles is the changing form and
growing importance of corporations.
B. 1. Common Carrier and Public Utility Regulation
Common carriers and public utilities are sub-
ject to a greater degree of regulation than general
businesses. Furthermore, as a subset of "busi-
nesses affected with a public interest," as discussed
in Subsection B.4, greater regulatory burdens are
permissible under the United States Constitution.
Under current law, telecommunications service
providers2 18 are both considered both common
TION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: 1780-1970, 13-57
(1970) (discussing the historical framework that led to the
growth of corporations as quasi-governmental bodies) [here-
inafter HURST].
"234 See Creighton, supra note 21, at 34-39; HURST, supra
note 22, at 16-19.
24 See Creighton, supra note 21, at 51-54; HURST, supra
note 22, at 13-18.
25 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§10101-11917 (1993))
(repealed in large part by the ICC Termination Act of 1995,
Pub. L. 104-88, 109 Stat. 805, 49 U.S.C. §10101 etseq. (1997)).
26 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§1-7 (2000)).
27 See infra notes 51.
28 See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §151
(2001) (defining "Telecommunications carrier" as "any pro-
vider of telecommunications services"); 47 U.S.C. §153(44)
(2001). "Telecommunications service" is defined as "the of-
fering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public,
or to 'such classes of users as to be effectively available directly
to the public, regardless of the facilities used." 47 U.S.C.
§153(46). "Telecommtnications" is defined as "the transmis-
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carriers and public utilities.29 Thus, if providing
broadband access is one in the same as providing
telecommunications services, then the legal obli-
gations imposed on common carriers and public
utilities become involved.
30
Unique obligations have been imposed on com-
mon carriers since the Middle Ages and are based
on the English common law of "public callings.""'
These obligations evolved in medieval England to
address numerous situations of economic coer-
cion, exploitation and the illegal wielding of bar-
gaining power. These obligations are: to charge
reasonable prices ('just price");32 to serve without
discrimination; and to exercise their calling with
adequate care, skill and honesty.
33
The same obligations were subsequently ap-
plied to a new category of entities, public utili-
ties, 3 4 which developed during the nineteenth
century in the United States. A public utility is a
private corporation that provides a service of pub-
lic importance, or necessity, under a government
grant of privilege. This grant of privilege imposes
sion, between or among points specified by the user, of infor-
mation of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received." 47 U.S.C.
§153(43).
29 See BARBARA A. CHERRY, THE CRISIS IN TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS CARRIER LIABILITY 50-57 (1999) [hereinafter CHERRY].
30 Whether the provision of broadband access should be
considered the provision of a telecommunications service is
highly debatable. See infra Section V (discussing some of the
ramifications of the inclusion or exclusion of broadband ac-
cess from the definition of telecommunications service).
31 Public callings originated with passage of the Statute
of Laborers in 1349 to prevent workers from extracting un-
reasonable wages due to large population loss from the Black
Death. Over time, any service performed for the public
outside of the feudalistic relationship of lord-to-man was con-
sidered a public calling. Examples include common carriers,
innkeepers, blacksmiths and surgeons. With the decline of
feudalism, most businesses came to be governed by the evolv-
ing common law of contracts. However, the tort obligations
of public callings remained for a few classes of businesses,
including common carriers. Notwithstanding the declining
scope of businesses to which the obligations of public callings
still applied, they were also imposed on a new class of busi-
nesses-public utilities-that evolved during the nineteenth cen-
tury. See MARTIN G. GLAESER, PUBLIC UTILITIES IN AMERICAN
CAPITALISM 197-99 (1957) (discussing the development of
public callings) [hereinafter GLAESER]; see generally Edward A.
Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. L. REv. 135 (1915)
(discussing the development of public callings).
32 A significant component of the obligations of public
callings is the doctrine of the 'lust price." Originating in me-
dieval England, the just price doctrine required equivalence
of value in exchange so that the price of a good or service
reflects its value for the community in general, and is not
excessively high or low due to unique circumstances of spe-
cific buyers or sellers. Its purpose was to enforce justice in
an affirmative duty to render service demanded
by any member of the public.3 5 Public utilities
were initially created by local government grants
of franchises, which were subsequently preempted
by the codification of public utility law in state
statutes. 36 It should be noted, however, that a pub-
lic utility's obligations tend to be greater than
those of a common carrier because a public utility
typically bears the affirmative duty to extend facili-
ties to serve an entire community, and is also con-
strained in its ability to discontinue the provision
of service.
3 7
B.2. Interstate Regulation of Common Carriers
As previously discussed, throughout the nine-
teenth century, the states enacted general incor-
poration statutes. The ease with which corpora-
tions could then be created provided the means
to accumulate vast levels of capital for industrial
enterprises and to conduct interstate business on
an unprecedented scale.38 During the latter part
economic transactions that involved coercion, exploitation
and misuse of bargaining power. John W. Baldwin, The Medie-
val Theories of the Just Price, in 49 TRANSACTIONS OF TIHE AMERI-
(AN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY 4, 68-80 (1959) (discussing just
price doctrine). See also ODD LANGHOLM, ECONOMICS IN THE
MEDIEVAL SCHOOLS 221-35 (1992) (discussing just price doc-
trine).
33 See CHERRY, supra note 29.
'4 See LEVY, supra note 19, at 355-65. The common law of
public utilities initially developed with the construction of
railroads, and was later applied to services resulting from
other inventions, such as the provision of telegraph service,
telephone service, electricity and gas. Id.
-35 See CHERRY, supra note 29, at 52-55; GLAESER, supra
note 31, at 216, 218-19.
:6 During the nineteenth century, states enacted statutes
to regulate railroads. An important legal innovation in these
laws was the creation of state regulatory commissions, or ex-
pert agencies, to implement and enforce the statutory
scheme. Starting in the late nineteenth century, but primarily
during the early twentieth century, states also placed tele-
graph and telephone companies under the jurisdiction of
state regulatory commissions-frequently the same agencies
that regulated railroads. See generally William K. Jones, Origins
of the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity: Developinents
in the States, 1870-1920, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 426 (1979) (dis-
cussing the creation of state regulatory commissions); KEN-
NETH LIPARTITO, THE BELL SYSTEM AND REGIONAL BUSINESS:
THE TELEPHONE IN THE SOUTH, 1877-1920, 175-207 (1989)
(discussing the creation of state regulatory commissions).
37 See LEVY, supra note 19, at 255-59. However, a few busi-
nesses are both common carriers and public utilities, such as
railroads and telecommunications companies. Id.
38 See generally HURST, supra note 22, at 13-55 (discussing
the development of the corporate form in the United States).
The rise of "big business" began in the 1880s, "that is, the
development of a new economic institution, the large enter-
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of the nineteenth century, common law remedies
did not adequately address the economic abuses
of large corporations, and corporations' interstate
activities were beyond the jurisdictional reach of
the states' police powers. 39 In response, a special
United States Senate committee, popularly known
as the Cullom Committee, was created to review
these economic abuses associated with large cor-
porations, particularly with regard to the railroad
industry.40 In 1886, the committee issued its re-
port, the Cullom Report, which presents a classi-
cal statement of need for federal economic regu-
lation of the railroad.
4 1
The Cullom Report stated, in pertinent part:
[N]o general question of governmental policy occupies
at this time so prominent a place in the thoughts of the
people as that of controlling the steady growth and ex-
tending influence of corporate power and of regulating
its relations to the public; and as no corporations are
more conspicuously before the public eye, and as there
are none whose operations so directly affect every citi-
zen in the daily pursuit of his business or avocation as
the corporations engaged in transportation, they natu-
rally receive the most consideration in this connec-
tion.42
In recognition of the railroad's importance to
commerce in the United States, and its historical
grant of privileges to perform a public function,
the Cullom Report highlighted the unique rela-
tionship that railroads have to the public, as
they-when compared to general businesses-
bear greater obligations. To address the eco-
nomic abuses in the railroad industry-particu-
larly discrimination in rates among customers,
speculative building and irresponsible financial
manipulation-it recommended a Federal statu-
prise, that commercialized, produced, and marketed goods
on an unprecedented scale for national and international
markets." Alfred D. Chandler, The Information Age in Historical
Perspective, IN A NAION TRANSFORMED By INFORMATION 15
(Alfred D. Chandler & James W. Cortada, eds., 2000). The
railroad and telegraph brought into being a new institution
that "consisted of a managerial, integrated corporate enter-
prise that transformed existing industries while creating new
ones, during what historians have termed the Second Indus-
trial Revolution." Id.
9 See generally Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (holding the state statute regl-
lating railroad transportation unconstitutional, because such
transportation was interstate commerce and within the sole
control and regulation of Congress tinder the federal consti-
tution).
40 See I Ti-iE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND IN-
DuSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE HisroRy OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES
31 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1973) [hereinafter Schwartz].
41 See generally id. at 16-87 (discussing the origins of the
Interstate Commerce Act and extracts from the Cullom Re-
tory scheme of regulation.4 " The next year, the In-
terstate Commerce Act ("ICA")4 4 was enacted
based on the Cullom Report, creating the first
federal expert agency to implement an interstate
regulatory statute.
45
B.3. Sherman Act and Refusals to Deal
As stated in the Cullom Report, the economic
abuses of large corporations were not confined to
railroads. However, it was easier politically to first
enact a federal statute regulating only the railroad
industry. 46 The ICA was soon followed by enact-
ment of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. 4 7 The
Sherman Act was the first federal antitrust statute
prohibiting certain anticompetitive and monopo-
listic practices by all general businesses.
48
The Sherman Act was enacted to regulate a
broader concept of economic coercion, which
had been developing under neoclassical econom-
ics. This new concept was broader than what had
been recognized under the common law. For ex-
ample, neoclassical economists expanded the con-
cept of economic coercion "to encompass the col-
lective refusal to deal, and . . . the loss of market
opportunities that competition would have af-
forded."
49
Although the economic abuses underlying pas-
sage of the Sherman Act were primarily in re-
sponse to concerns for consumers as end users,
plaintiffs have also pursued claims in their role as
competitors. 511 More specifically, cases had been
brought involving collective, or unilateral refusals
to deal with competitors.5 ' Assertion of such
port).
42 Id. at 33.
43 Id. at 31-87.
44 Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§10101-11917 (1993)).
45 See GuIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 5-7, 31-58 (1982). The enactment of the ICA is part
of a larger legal trend towards statttorification that started in
the nineteenth century to address the inadequacies of com-
mon law remedies. Id.
461 See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 31 (stating that the deci-
sion of the United States Supreme Court in Wabash v. Illinois,
was also a significant catalyst for the passage of the ICA).
47 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)).
48 1 PHILLHP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW §§101-03 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP VOL. I].
4 i. at §§ 104a-b.
5"0 Id.
5I For cases involving unilateral refusals to deal, see, e.g.,
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claims prior to the Sherman Act were uncommon,
as tort common law imposed liability for refusals
to deal only on "businesses affected with a public
interest," which included common carriers and
public utilities.52 Over time, however, the courts
have interpreted the Sherman Act to prohibit re-
fusals to deal for a broader set of businesses and
circumstances. 53 This trend has also led to the de-
velopment of the essential facilities doctrine. 5
4
The primary use of this doctrine is to require a
monopolist to share with competitors at a reason-
able price, an input that is deemed essential for
viable competition in a related market. 55 A com-
monality these refusal to deal cases is the availabil-
ity of a legal remedy requiring access by a compet-
itor to some service or facility deemed essential
for viable competition.
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (holding that
the defendant violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and en-
joining the dominant owner of movie theaters (defendant)
from interfering in the contract terms between movie pro-
ducers and competing theaters in other towns); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) (holding that
the defendant was subject to antitrust regulation and order-
ing the defendant-monopolist of electric transmission lines
to wheel power to municipalities that operated their own re-
tail distribution facilities). For cases involving collective refus-
als to deal, see, e.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St.
Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (holding that defendant was en-
gaged in illegal restraint and an attempted monopoly, and
therefore the court required members of the railroad associa-
tion to admit their railroad competitors to their consortium
to enable access to the only existing railway bridge); Associ-
ated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (holding defen-
dant in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and requiring
the Associated Press to admit non-member newspapers on
terms that did not discriminate against newspapers that com-
peted with existing AP members). For a discussion of cases
regarding refusals to deal, see generally 3A PHILLIP AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw §770-72 (2d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP VOL. 3A].
52 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP VOL. 3A, supra note 51, at
§§770c and 770d.
53 See supra note 51.
54 AREEDA & HOVENCAMP VOL. 3A, supra note 51, at §771c
(explaining that although the United States Supreme Court
has provided remedies for refusals to deal in some cases,
what has come to be known as the essential facilities doctrine
was developed in lower federal courts and has not been ac-
cepted by the United States Supreme Court). Furthermore,
having evolved as a result of some courts' interpretation of
the Sherman Act, the essential facilities doctrine is consid-
ered common law in some federal courts' jurisdictions. 2
PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw
§302 (rev. ed. 1995).
55 MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.
B. 4. "Businesses Affected With A Public Interest"
An important function of the courts is to deter-
mine when government regulation exceeds con-
stitutional limits. In the nineteenth century, im-
portant cases were decided to delineate the per-
missible scope of State regulation under the
United States Constitution. 56 Of particular impor-
tance here is the concept of "businesses affected with
a public interest," which developed under the En-
glish common law, and is recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois.
57
Under this concept, the permissible scope of State
regulation under its police power is greater for
businesses affected with a public interest than for
general businesses. 58 Businesses affected with a
public interest are those for which it was deemed
that the dependence of the customer required
protection; and those businesses included com-
mon carriers and public utilities. 59 Key attributes
of these businesses 6° are: (1) that the service is of
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 891 (1983). Liability under the essential facilities doc-
trine is based on the following criteria: "(1) control of the
essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a competitor's inability
practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; (3)
the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4)
the feasibility of providing the facility." Id.
56 See generally LEVY, supra note 19, at 229-81 (discussing
the development of case law during the nineteenth century
that delineated constitutional limitations on states' exercise
of their police powers).
57 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
58 See id. at 126, 130-32.
59 See generally GLAESER, supra note 31, at 202, 206-19.
(1) Those which are carried on under the authority of a
public grant of privileges which either expressly or im-
pliedly imposes the affirmative duty of rendering a pub-
lic service demanded by any member of the public. Such
are the railroads, other common carriers and public util-
ities.
(2) Certain occupations, regarded as exceptional, the
public interest attaching to which, recognized from ear-
liest times, has survived the period of arbitrary laws by
Parliament or Colonial legislatures for regulating all
trades and callings. Such are those of the keepers of
inns, cabs, and grist mills.
(3) Businesses which though not public at their incep-
tion may be fairly said to have risen to be such and have
become subject in consequence to some government
regulation. They have come to hold such a peculiar rela-
tion to the public that this is superimposed upon them.
Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas, 262 U.S. 522, 535 (1923).
See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 532 (1934) (noting
that in Munn v. Illinois, the Court found that a grain elevator
fell under the third category because the "elevator was strate-
gically situated and that a large portion of the public found it
highly inconvenient to deal with others.").
60 GLAESER, supra note 31, at 206-19. Significantly, the
second attribute includes numerous situations in which corn-
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special public importance or necessity; (2) that
circumstances or characteristics of supply are such
that the service is not available in a competitive
market; and (3) that the activity has current and/
or future widespread effects on the community at
large.61
In Nebbia v. New York,1 2 the Supreme Court ef-
fectively broadened the scope of permissible regu-
lation under the police power for any business, so
that the need to prove that a business did or did
not fall into the historical classes of businesses af-
fected with a public interest fell into disuse."
3
However, the traditional definition of businesses
affected with a public interest is not irrelevant.
This is because, even though the Court found that
the police power was coextensive with regulation
in the public interest, it still maintained that per-
missible regulation as to a given business depends
on the specific circumstances in each case."1
4
Nebbia v. New York is significant in that the court
held that even though a wider range of businesses
can now be subject to some government regula-
tion, what is deemed a reasonable assertion of
that governmental authority is still likely to be
greater for a business in which the circumstances
are similar to those of traditional justifications for
regulating "businesses affected with a public inter-
est."
C. Access Issues Affecting Welfare Rights
The legal principles affecting welfare rights in
petition is considered impracticable. Such situations might
arise from the grant of some special governmental privilege,
even a legal monopoly, such as to common carriers or public
utilities. However it also includes situations that arise without
government involvement, such as firms being strategically sit-
uated in terms of location (grain elevators) or time (innkeep-
ers with respect to travelers). See, e.g., Munn, 94 U.S. at 126,
131-32.
61 GLAESER, supra note 31, at 206-19.Significantly, the sec-
ond attribute includes numerous situations in which compe-
tition is considered impracticable. Such situations might
arise from the grant of some special governmental privilege,
even a legal monopoly, such as to common carriers or public
utilities. However it also includes situations that arise without
government involvement, such as firms being strategically sit-
uated in terms of location (grain elevators) or time (innkeep-
ers with respect to travelers). See, e.g., Munn, 94 U.S. at 126,
131-32.
62 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
6-3 Id. at 536. "It is clear that there is no closed class or
category of businesses affected with a public interest, and the
function of courts in the application of' the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments is to determine in each case whether cir-
cumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasona-
Table 1 represent government efforts to institu-
tionalize some minimum level of rights in terms
of access to essential goods and services. Under
English law, this concept originated with the pas-
sage of the Elizabethan Poor Laws in the sixteenth
century to address beggary and civil disorder
caused by famine.65 Under these statutes, a poor
tax was imposed to finance the care of paupers.""
In the United States, early forms of governmen-
tally funded relief for "needy" groups of individu-
als began with pension benefits for Civil War vet-
erans in the nineteenth century and mothers'
pensions in the early twentieth century."7 The
modern relief system in the United States devel-
oped during two periods of social policy innova-
tion. This first period of innovation was the New
Deal of the 1930s. The second era of change was
during the Great Society, which was largely in re-
sponse to the Civil Rights movement and the
Nixon era reforms of the 1960s and early 1970s.11a
During the first period, innovations included the
establishment of old-age pensions, unemploy-
ment benefits, and relief programs for the aged,
the blind and the orphaned in the Social Security
Act of 1935."i' During the second period, the fed-
eral government intervened to break down state
barriers that had evolved to impede eligibility for
the relief programs. 7" All of the welfare-related
programs are intended to provide needy individu-
als-whether old, unemployed, poor, or dis-
abled-with the financial means to meet basic
ble exertion of governmental atthority or condemn it as ar-
bitrary or discriminatory." Id.
114 Id. at 531, 536-38. The Court proceeded to examine
the specific circumstances of the case-concerning the consti-
tutionality of price regulation of retail milk sales in New York-
in a manner reflective of the traditional attributes of busi-
nesses affected with a public interest. The Court found that,
even though the dairy industry was clearly not a public utility
(having not received any public grant or franchise) nor a mo-
nopoly, the importance of the product, maladjustments of
the market, and widespread impact on the community-con-
clusions of state legislative investigation-were compelling rea-
sons for upholding the state statute. Id.
65 See FRANCIS Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGU-
LAFIN" THE POOR: THE FUNGurIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 8-22
(1993) [hereinafter PIVEN & CLOWARD].
6, I.
67 TIIEDA SKOCPOL, PROEGI'ING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS:
THE POLITIC.AL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN TIlE UNITED
STATES 7-11 (1996).
'8 See THE POLIrICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNrrED
STATi.S 5-9 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988).
i9 See PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 65, at 248-84.
70 /d. at 248.
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human needs, such as food, housing, transporta-
tion and health care.
However, government has also intervened to
ensure access by all citizens-rather than just
targeting low income groups-to other essential
services, such as education.7 1 Modern universal
service policy7 2 with regard to telecommunica-
tions services has characteristics of both. It re-
quires nondiscriminatory, reasonable rates for all
customers, as well as funding mechanisms to sub-
sidize access for targeted groups. As previously dis-
cussed, the requirements of nondiscrimination
and just and reasonable rates for all customers are
based on common carrier and public utility laws.
Subsidy mechanisms for targeted groups began
with implicit subsidies in the regulated price
structure, and explicit funding mechanisms for
the benefit of certain targeted groups were re-
cently codified by Congress in Section 254 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.73
D. Access Issues Affecting Free Speech Rights
The Free Speech Clause of the United States
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make
no law . ..abridging the freedom of speech.."
74
The First Amendment limits actions of the federal
government; however, it has also been held appli-
cable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
75
Freedom of speech not only protects the inter-
ests of individuals, but it also sustains a constitu-
71 See Barbara A. Cherry, Crisis of Public Utility Deregulation
and the Unrecognized Welfare State, Address at the 29th Telecommu-
nications Policy Research Conference, 1, 4, 12, 20, at http://arxiv.
org/ftp/cs/papers/0109/0109038.pdf (2001) (discussing
how common carrier and public utility regulation can also be
viewed as an early form of welfare state regulation in provid-
ing universalistic-rather than residualistic (means-tested)-
benefits) [hereinafter Cherry Telecomm Address].
72 See MARTIN L. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE POLICY
4-10 (1997) (explaining universal service policy as it devel-
oped in the second half of the twentieth century as distin-
guished from its early meaning as interconnection policy in
the early twentieth century).
71 47 U.S.C. §254. See generally Cherry & Wildman 1999,
supra note 12 (discussing service mechanisms and policies).
See also FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, UNIVERSAL
SERVICE, at http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/universal service/wel
com.html (providing an overview of the current universal ser-
vice regime).
74 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
75 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
76 See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 145-46
(quoting Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)).
The First Amendment means ... that the only constitu-
tional democracy. 76 The courts recognize this
dual role when addressing constitutional chal-
lenges to governmentally imposed access man-
dates under the freedom of speech clause of the
First Amendment. First, the courts acknowledge
that government intervention may be permissible
in order to promote free speech given the essen-
tial role that free speech plays in maintaining the
legitimacy of the government itself. In this regard,
"'it has long been a basic tenet of national com-
munications policy that "the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and an-
tagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the
public."' 77 This is often referred to as the view-
point diversity principle, 7 and its focus is on the
benefits to the public.7 9 Second, in determining
whether a given access mandate is constitutional,
courts review the impact on the free speech rights
of the party bearing the obligation to provide ac-
cess to other speakers.x0 As discussed more fully in
Section VI.D, the jurisprudence for determining
when the government's interest justifies limiting a
party's free speech rights is very complex.
. In the past, the viewpoint diversity has justified
government action mandating that owners of
channels of mass communication open access to
their facilities to certain speakers. Mandates to
provide access to certain speakers have been up-
held in numerous situations such as the equal
time rules for political candidates"' and the now
repealed fairness doctrine s 2 imposed on broad-
casters; the must-carry requirements imposed on
tional way our Government can preserve itself is to leave
its people the fullest possible freedom to praise, criticize
or discuss, as they see fit, all governmental policies and
to suggest, if they desire, that even its most fundamental
postulates are bad and should be changed; 'Therein lies
the security of the Republic, the very foundation of con-
stitutional government.' Id.
77 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64
(1994) (Turner I) (quoting United States v. Midwest Video
Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Assoc. Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945))).
78 See Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amend-
ment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062,
1075 (1994).
79 In this context, the public's status is that of an audi-
ence.
81) See infra notes 83, 84 and 87.
81 See MICHAEL BOTEIN, REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC
MASS MEDIA 499-508 (3d ed. 1998) (discussing the FCC rules
regarding political broadcasts) [hereinafter BOTEIN].




cable companies;"-" and the carry one, carry all
rule imposed on satellite television carriers.
8 4
At this juncture, it is important to recognize the
differences in the free speech rights of electronic
mass media and telecommunications carriers. As
previously discussed in Section 1V.B.1, telecom-
munications carriers are considered both com-
mon carriers and public utilities and, as such, are
required to provide nondiscriminatory access to
all customers. Given the two-way (and essentially
one-on-one) interactive nature of telecommunica-
tions service, in essence, all subscribers are consid-
ered speakers.8 5 The subscribers-not the carri-
ers-control the content of the information trans-
mitted over the facilities. In this regard, telecom-
munications carriers are not speakers."! On the
other hand, electronic mass media consist prima-
rily of one-way transmissions from a speaker to
many viewers. The owner of the channel of com-
munication controls the content that is transmit-
ted over the facilities, and the viewers are passive
members of an audience. Under these circum-
stances, providers of electronic mass media-but
not telecommunications carriers-are considered
speakers entitled to some First Amendment pro-
tection.87 With the convergence of technology
platforms, the courts will have to revisit the First
Amendment distinctions in speaker status be-
84 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997)
(Turner II) (holding as unconstitutional the must-carry pro-
visions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act, in which Congress required cable compa-
nies to dedicate some of their channels to local broadcast tel-
evision stations to ensure that all households have access to
information and entertainment on an equal footing with
those who subscribe to cable).
84 Satellite Broad. and Communications Ass'n v. FCC,
275 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding constitutional as a con-
tent-neutral regulation, the FCC carry one carry all rule man-
dated by the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act, in
which Congress required satellite television carriers to carry
all requesting local broadcast stations in the market where
the carrier voluntarily decides to carry one local station in
order to, in part, preserve a multiplicity of local broadcast
outlets for over-the-air-viewers who do not subscribe either to
satellite or cable service).
Significantly, both the must carry provisions on cable com-
panies and the carry one, carry all rule on satellite television
carriers are access mandates for speakers (broadcasters) who
are also providers of competitive mass media facilities. In
this way, these access mandates have similarities to the essen-
tial facilities doctrine discussed in Section IV.B.3. On the
other hand, the cited requirements imposed on broadcasters
are access mandates for speakers who are users, but not also
competitors, of mass media facilities. In this respect, the ac-
cess mandates are similar to a limited form of common car-
tween telecommunications carriers and electronic
mass media providers.
V. APPLYING "ESSENTIALITY OF ACCESS"
TO BROADBAND ACCESS ISSUES
This section applies "essentiality of access" as an
organizing principle for analyzing a sampling of
broadband access issues. For each issue, assume
that the relevant aspect of broadband access is
considered an essential service or facility, and the
circumstances are such that the underlying pur-
pose or problem must be addressed through gov-
ernment intervention. Given this assumption, the
purposes of this section are to identify for each
broadband access issue: (1) what legal principles
should be applied based on the mapping of access
issues-to-legal principles described in Section IV
and summarized in Table 1; (2) what policy ac-
tions have taken place or are pending; and (3)
the consistencies or inconsistencies between (1)
and (2). Section VI extends the analysis in Section
V by incorporating the distinction between indi-
viduals' and corporations' constitutional rights
and the implications for addressing broadband
access issues.
The array of broadband access issues presented
here was selected so that each type of access prob-
lem-to-legal principle identified in Section IV
rier regulation.
85 In addition, for each transmission each party is usually
both a speaker to and an audience of the other party.
86 But cf Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of
California, 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (recognizing that public utili-
ties are speakers with First Amendment rights with regard to
the provision of information in bill inserts mailed to custom-
ers).
87 But cf Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Nat'l Cable
Television Ass'n, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that
telecommunications carriers do have free speech rights with
regard to the provision of video programming over their own
facilities). Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to
discuss the complexities of the jurisprudence in this area, it is
important to recognize that courts apply different constitu-
tional tests in dealing with the First Amendment status of
electronic media regulatory policies. A strict scrutiny test ap-
plies to "content specific" regulation. On the other hand, an
intermediate level of scrutiny test, nominally developed in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), applies to
"content neutral" regulation. In some rare cases, a minimal
scrutiny test is applied. Generally, strict scrutiny applies to
the traditional print media; intermediate scrutiny applies to
cable companies; and minimal scrutiny applies to broadcast-
ing companies. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 42 F.3d at
190-93. See also BOTEIN, supra note 81, at 292-456 (discussing
these different constitutional standards in the electronic
mass media context).
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would arguably be applicable to a broadband is-
sue. In addition, the broadband access issues are
defined with reference to the layered model of
the Internet as described by Werbach. 88 The
layered model is a useful analytical tool for dis-
cussing the relationship of the technological reali-
ties of broadband to the regulatory principles ap-
plied to it."9
Table 2 provides an overview of the "essentiality
of access" analysis discussed in this section. The
broadband access issues are described in terms of
the essential service or facility for which access is
being sought and for whom. For each broadband
issue, the table then describes: the nature of the
relationship between the intended access recipi-
ent and the access provider; the nature of the un-
derlying purpose or problem to be addressed; the
applicable legal principle from Table 1; and re-
cent or pending policy actions.
A. Access for Individual End Users
The first broadband issue described in Table 2
is to ensure that all individual end user customers
have access to the physical layer of the broadband
network. Without access to fundamental transmis-
sion facilities, end users have no access to broad-
band services. For this issue, the underlying prob-
lem that may impede such access is economic co-
ercion arising from an inequality of bargaining
power between the broadband provider of the
physical layer and the end users. This unequal
bargaining power could manifest itself in prac-
tices such as provider refusals to deal with end
users, excessively high prices, unreasonable terms
and conditions and unreasonable discrimination
among otherwise similarly situated end users. This
is the same problem that led to the imposition of
special obligations on "businesses affected with a
public interest," particularly common carriers and
public utilities, as described in Sections IV.B.1
and B.4. Referring to Table 1, such problems have
traditionally been addressed by imposing a legal
duty on the provider of the essential service facil-
ity so that the government could provide non-dis-
criminatory access at reasonable rates and with an
adequate standard of care. This legal principle
has its origins in the doctrine of "public callings"
from medieval England.
Recently, the FCC has adopted new policies
that would affect the likelihood of securing broad-
band access for all individual end users. First, in
its Cable Modem Access Order,1° the FCC defined
cable modem service as an information service
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.91
Furthermore, the FCC declared that cable
modem service is an integrated offering with no
separable telecommunications component. 92 As a
result, provision of cable modem service involves
the provision of no service subject to common
carrier regulation. This means that individual end
users have no common carrier access rights to the
physical layer of the cable companies' networks,
which are used for Internet access. The FCC's rul-
ing that cable modem service is an information
service with no separable telecommunications
component is currently on appeal.
93
Recognizing that the Cable Modem decision
will pose asymmetric regulatory obligations be-
tween cable modem service providers and wire-
88 See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1
J. TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 37 (2002) (originally an ad-
dress delivered at the 28th Telecommunications Policy Re-
search Conference (Aug. 17, 2000)) [hereinafter Werbach].
89 The layered model reflects the architectural design of
the Internet as an "end-to-end design and a layered protocol
stack."Id at 19. Four layers of a vertical stack are considered
relevant for regulatory purposes. They are the physical layer,
the logical layer, the applications (or service) layer and the
content layer. The physical layer is the "physical infrastructure
of the underlying networks [whatever the technology plat-
form]: wireline (copper), cable, fiber, terrestrial wireless and
satellite." Id. at 20. The logical layer is the logical infrastruc-
ture, "which includes the management and routing functions
that keep information flowing smoothly within and across
networks." Id. at 21. The applications layer consists of the
functions that are perhaps most familiar to end users. These
functions include, but are not limited to, "basic voice teleph-
ony,... Internet access, IP telephony, [and] video program-
ruing." Id. at 23. "The content layer involves the information
delivered to and from users as part of the applications [that
run] over communications networks." Id. at 24.
90 Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet
over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798 (2002) [hereinafter
Cable Modem Access Order].
'1 Id. at 4822, para. 38.
92 Id. at 4822-23, paras. 38-39.




Table 2: Applying "Essentiality of Access" to Broadband Access Issues
Applicable
Relationship of "Essentiality
Broadband Access Recipient Underlying Purpose of Access"
Access Issue to Access Provider or Problem Legal Principles Policy Actions to Date
Enduser access to Individual enduser Economic coercion Non-discriminatory Cable modem service
physical infrastructure customers, arising from inequality access at reasonable is an integrated infor-
of broadband network, of bargaining power rates and with ade- mation service with no
between provider and quate standard of care common carriage reg-
customer as to an (i.e. "business affected ulation. The same may
essential service, with a public interest", apply to wireline
common carrier, or broadband Internet
public utility regula- access providers.
tion).
Physical and/or logi- Communities of Potential unavailability Duty to serve (e.g. For narrowband service,
cal infrastructures of enduser customers. of essential service in build-out requirement; telecommunications
broadband network portions of commu- exit barrier); perhaps carriers have build out
need to be ubiqui- nity. also some form of sub- requirements and eli-
tously available sidization or govern- gible carriers must
throughout the com- ment privilege (e.g. serve the entire service
munity. franchise) to address area.
financial burden of Cable companies have
requirements. build out require-
ments for cable service
in franchise area.
Access to the physical Competitors. Viewpoint diversity Mandatory access to Cable modem service
layer, through inter- principle and pro- address refusal to deal providers not required
connection at the logi- vider's refusal to pro- (e.g. essential facilities to provide access to
cal layer, for ISP's, vide access to its doctrine), competitive ISP's.
who are competitors essential facility with Wireline Internet
at the logical layer. competitors in a access providers may
related market, not have to unbundle
transmission compo-
nent for sale under
tariff.
Access to physical, and Targeted enduser cus- Inequality among indi- Some form of subsidi- Internet access is
possibly logical, infra- tomers. viduals to access essen- zation for benefit of within definition of
structure of broad- tial services due to needy customers; per- universal service for
band service within specific unaffordability haps also coupled with eligible schools and
definition of universal factors (e.g. indigence some form of duty to libraries and for rural
service. or high cost of serving serve, health care providers.





Interconnection Speakers as competi- Viewpoint diversity Refusals to deal with Interconnection
among broadband net- tors (for benefit of principle coupled with speakers prohibited. among telecommuni-
works, audience). potential refusals to cations carriers; must
deal. carry requirements on
cable companies; carry
one, carry all rule on
satellite television car-
riers.
line broadband Internet access providers (DSL
providers), the FCC has issued a Wireline Broad-
band Internet Access Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking ("NPRM"). 94 In this NPRM, the FCC
94 In re the Appropriate Framework for Broadband Ac-
cess to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of Proposed
tentatively concludes that wireline broadband In-
ternet service to end users is also an integrated
information service with no offering of a separa-
Rulemaking, 17 FCC Rcd. 3019 (2002) [hereinafter Wireline
Broadband Internet Access NPRM].
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ble telecommunications service.95 If this tentative
conclusion is adopted, common carrier obliga-
tions would not apply to the physical layer of wire-
line broadband providers, even though wireline
providers would still be common carriers as their
narrowband physical network infrastructures.
By attempting to provide intermodal regulatory
parity in this manner, the FCC would create in-
tramodal asymmetric regulation between the physical
layers of narrowband and broadband services.
This is because a wireline carrier provides both
narrowband and broadband services over the
same physical lines (at least for residential cus-
tomers). The fundamental question is whether
such intramodal asymmetric regulation is sustain-
able. If not, then the entire common carrier regu-
latory regime for telecommunications services
could erode.
B. Access for Communities of Individual End
users
The second broadband issue described in Table
2 is ensuring that all communities have access to
the physical infrastructure of the broadband net-
works. While the first issue is concerned with ac-
cess to existing essential services or facilities, the
second assumes that such services or facilities may
not yet exist in some communities, or portions
thereof. For the latter issues, the underlying prob-
lem is that providers may refuse to invest in and
serve certain areas. Reasons for refusing to serve
may include business plans based on targeting
higher profit areas, or costs of providing service
that exceed the revenue that would reasonably be
expected to be generated. This is similar to the
issue and underlying problem that led to the use
of franchises and public utility regulation to im-
pose an affirmative duty to serve, as discussed in
Section IV.B.1. Franchises (granting an exclusive
privilege to serve) customarily imposed require-
ments on the public utility to build out and serve
the entire franchise area-that is, imposed an af-
firmative duty to serve-as well as placed limita-
tions on the utility's ability to discontinue provi-
sion of service. 96
95 Id. at 3029-24, paras. 17-26.
96 See supra note 20; CHFRRY, supra note 29, at 50-57.
97 See Unilateral and Bilateral Rules, supra note 12, at 39-58.
Carrier of last resort obligations were historically imposed by
the states on incumbent monopoly providers, for both local
For telecommunications carriers, similar re-
quirements have been codified in state statutes,
and/or enforced through the imposition of car-
rier of last resort obligations97 with regard to the
provision of narrowband services. Similar build-out
requirements have been included in local govern-
ments' franchise agreements with cable compa-
nies as to the provision of cable service. However,
regulation of telecommunications carriers has
also included some form of subsidization scheme
either through the rate structure or through
funding mechanisms, to help carriers remain fi-
nancially viable while providing essentially ubiqui-
tous networks. 98 Such subsidization has been used
to implement universal service policy, which has
affected welfare rights, as discussed in Section
1V.C.
Section 157 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 directs the FCC and state commissions to
"encourage the deployment on a reasonable and
timely basis of advanced telecommunications ca-
pability to all Americans." 99 Thus far, no provider
of broadband services has been required to build
out physical (or logical) infrastructure to serve
communities. As previously described, the ex-
isting affirmative duties to serve apply to narrow-
band and cable services, but not to broadband
services. To impose an affirmative obligation to
build out broadband facilities would be an expan-
sion of, but not inconsistent with, the current reg-
ulatory regimes for telecommunications carriers
and cable companies.
C. Access for Competitors
The third broadband issue described in Table 2
is ensuring that competitive Internet Service Prov-
iders (ISPs) have access to the physical infrastruc-
ture of a broadband provider through intercon-
nection at the logical layer. The primary purpose
underlying a policy for such access is the govern-
ment's interest in viewpoint diversity. More specif-
ically, viewpoint diversity at the application and
content layers can be achieved through diversity
at the logical layer, because choice and quality of
both applications and content vary among ISPs.
exchange and toll services. Id. at 42. The continuing enforce-
ment of such obligations in a market open to competition is
an untested legal question.
98 See id. at 39-58.
99 47 U.S.C. §157.
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For refusal to deal with competitors, the applica-
ble legal principle from Table 1 is to prohibit the
refusal to deal. In particular, if the provider's fa-
cilities are considered essential to viable competi-
tion in the related market, the essential facilities
doctrine would apply."()
As part of the Cable Modem Access Order dis-
cussed in Section V.A., the FCC has refused to
compel cable modem service providers-even if
they also provide local exchange service over the
same facilities-to provide access to its physical
network to competitive ISPs.(1I As previously dis-
cussed, in the Wireline Broadband Internet Ac-
cess NPRM, the FCC also tentatively concludes
that wireline broadband Internet access is an inte-
grated information service and is not required to
provide the physical layer on a common carrier
basis to end users. 102 As for access by competitive
ISPs, the FCC seeks comments as to whether the
Bell Operating Companies should be relieved of
the Computer Inquiry requirements to unbundle
the transmission component for sale under
tariff. 0(-
If access to broadband should later be consid-
ered essential, retention of the Cable Modem Ac-
cess Order could adversely impact individuals as
citizens by diminishing their access to diverse
sources of information and viewpoints. In addi-
tion, to the extent that individuals' access to ISPs
and use of the Internet is considered that of a
speaker, then individuals' free speech rights as
speakers would also be adversely affected. First
Amendment rights would be eroded further
should the FCC decide to relieve the Bell Operat-
ing Companies of the obligation to unbundle
their transmission component of broadband in
the Wireline Broadband Internet Access
NPRM. 104
MO One could argue that the purpose of the third broad-
band issue discussed here is one of antitrust tinder the Sher-
man Act. However, this concern is subsumed by the view-
point diversity principle. Viewpoint diversity provides an ad-
ditional, distinct government interest from the antitrust con-
cern that may make the need for government intervention
more compelling. In this regard, the reader should note that
the first broadband issue in Table 2 could also list viewpoint
diversity as an added purpose. However, for purposes of dis-
cussion, it is preferable to address the impact solely on the
economic rights as a starting point.
101 See Cable Modem Access Order, supra note 90, at pa-
ras. 33 and 38.
D. Broadband as Universal Service
The fourth broadband issue described in Table
2 is expanding the definition of universal service
under Section 254 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 to include access to broadband ser-
vice. Again, for purposes of discussion here, this
issue assumes that broadband is considered an es-
sential service. The problem is that there is ine-
quality among individuals' access to broadband
service due to affordability factors. For example,
some residents may be low income or others may
not be able to afford prices in high cost areas.
This is the same problem that has been addressed
by legal principles affecting welfare rights dis-
cussed in Section IV.C. From Table 1, the legal
principles suggested are: providing some funding
directly to the disadvantaged individuals to obtain
the service or subsidizing the essential service on
behalf of the disadvantaged individuals.
At this time, FCC rules include Internet access
within the definition of universal service for eligi-
ble schools and libraries, as well as for rural health
care providers without toll-free access to the In-
ternet.115 As a result, these eligible entities receive
Internet access at a discount, and, in turn, the eli-
gible carrier providing the access receives federal
universal service support to compensate for the
relevant discount. The discounts for eligible
schools and libraries are significantly greater for
those that are economically disadvantaged or in
rural areas. 11 6 Furthermore, in Section 214(e) of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, eligible car-
riers are required to provide universal service
throughout the service area. 1 7 In other words,
there is also a duty to serve in order to ensure
availability of Internet access service.
Therefore, for eligible schools, libraries and ru-
ral health care providers, the current universal
service mechanism is consistent with the existing
legal principles that have been applied to provide
1)2 See Wireline Broadband Internet Access NPRM, supra
note 94, at para. 20.
': See id. at paras. 43-53.
114 Arguably, users of the Internet could be speakers and
audience simultaneously, as with telecommunications ser-
vice. See infra Section IV.D. The same could be true of ISPs.
But, in order to contrast situations where the competitor de-
nied access is a non-speaker with those where the competitor
denied access is a speaker, the third broadband issue here
assumes that the ISPs are not speakers. See infra Section V.E.
105 47 C.F.R. §§54.503 and 54.621 (2001).
l06 47 C.F.R. §54.505 (2001).
107 47 U.S.C. §214(e) (2001).
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disadvantaged individuals with access to essential
services. The eligible entities receive discounted
rates, with higher discounts for disadvantaged en-
tities. However, the size of the existing funding
obligations of the federal universal service sup-
port mechanisms, which for eligible schools and
libraries and rural health care providers is over
two billion dollars per year, is of major con-
cern. 10 8
Federal universal service support for disadvan-
taged individuals (low income households, high
cost areas) does exist, but only for access to the
narrowband physical infrastructure. If the defini-
tion of universal service is modified to include
broadband, existing federal universal service sup-
port mechanisms could also be used to support
access to broadband. However, expanding the
definition of universal service to include broad-
band for disadvantaged individuals would only
magnify the already large funding burden im-
posed on the telecommunications industry. To
preserve the federal universal support mecha-
nisms for current recipients, much less enable ex-
pansion of support for broadband access to indi-
viduals directly, the means of raising the funding
for these mechanisms may need to change. Alter-
natives include federal legislation that would en-
able the FCC to also access contributions based
on the intrastate revenues of telecommunications
carriers, or funding from the federal govern-
ment's general tax revenues.10 '
E. Access by Speaker as End User or
Competitor
The interconnection among broadband net-
works in order to ensure that the Internet contin-
ues to function as a network of networks is the fi-
108 In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Report and Order, 67
Fed. Reg. 11268 (2002) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 54
(2002)) (considering modifications to the system under
which contributions are made by telecommunications carri-
ers-based on assessments against interstate revenues-to
fund the federal universal service support mechanisms in
light of the existing funding burden). Concerns as to the via-
bility of the existing funding burden are driven, in large part,
by declining interstate long distance revenues and the FCC's
lack of authority to assess contributions based on carriers' in-
trastate revenues. Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC,
183 F.3d 393, 448 (5th Cir. 1999).
109 See supra note 94; Unilateral and Bilateral Rules, supra
note 12, at 39-58.
110 Some might argue that ISPs may also be speakers. If
nal issue addressed in Table 2. This issue is impor-
tant in that it provides viewpoint diversity (access
to a diversity of applications and content). Poten-
tial interconnection problems are primarily at the
physical and logical layers due to refusals to deal
among the network providers. Such refusals to
deal among competitors pose obstacles similar to
those discussed for competitive ISPs.
Both the third and fifth broadband issues are
similar, but they differ in an important respect.
The third broadband issue addresses access by
ISPs in their economic relationship as a competi-
tor of the provider, but also as a non-speaker under
the First Amendment. 1 0  However, the fifth
broadband issue addresses access by competitors
who may also be speakers under the First Amend-
ment. Therefore, under the fifth broadband issue,
the free speech rights of competitors may also be
adversely affected.
As discussed in Section IV, where not inconsis-
tent with the constitutional rights of the provider,
the government may require providers of elec-
tronic mass media to open access to speakers.
This is true even if the speaker is a mass media
competitor using a different technology platform.
Some requirements have already been imposed
on cable companies and satellite television carri-
ers to carry local broadcasting stations in support
of viewpoint diversity. These are one-way intercon-
nection requirements from local broadcasting sta-
tions to cable and satellite systems. Although
these requirements do not apply with regard to
the provision of broadband, they do provide a
precedent for imposing interconnection require-
ments among competing technology platforms
that also have speaker status. I I Evaluation of the
government's interest in imposing access to com-
petitors as speakers will, of course, have to be bal-
so, then the problems raised under the third and fifth broad-
band issues are similar. However, for purposes of analysis
here, it is instructive to contrast situations where competitors
are non-speakers with those where competitors are speakers.
See supra note 104.
1 11 Telecommunications carriers are also required to in-
terconnect with each other, whether or not they provide
competing services. However, telecommunications carriers
have a First Amendment status as non-speakers with respect
to the provision of telecommunications services. See supra
Section IV.D. However, if common carrier regulation er-
odes-for example, as with the first and third broadband is-
sues-the status of telecommunications carriers as non-




anced against the free speech rights of the access
provider.
F. Summary of Effects on Broadband Access
Issues
As the discussion throughout Section V shows,
current regulation and likely outcomes of pend-
ing proceedings could pose obstacles for achiev-
ing the five types of access issues described in Ta-
ble 2 should broadband be considered an essen-
tial service of facility. These obstacles could create
adverse effects for the intended access recipients.
Table 3 provides an overview of these obstacles
based on the analyses of the five broadband access
issues conducted in this section. In the first col-
umn, each broadband access issue is described as
it appears in Table 2. For each broadband access
issue, the table then describes: the nature of the
current, or pending consideration of, relevant
regulation; the likely effect of that regulation, if
unchanged, on achieving the type of access at is-
sue; and the likely adverse effects on the intended
access recipients in terms of the type of rights af-
fected.
At this juncture, it may be helpful to review the
results described in the last two columns. For the
first broadband issue, the economic rights of indi-
viduals as end users of both narrowband and broad-
band physical infrastructures may be adversely af-
fected due to intramodal asymmetric regulation
of narrowband and broadband infrastructures of
wireline (non-cable) providers. For the second is-
sue, the economic rights of communities of indi-
vidual end users of broadband infrastructure may
be similarly diminished.
As for the fourth broadband issue, to the extent
that the financial burden of federal universal ser-
vice support becomes unsustainable, the welfare
rights of intended recipients would be adversely
affected. Therefore, if the burden is unsustainable
under the current definition of universal service,
it certainly would not be sustainable upon a
broadening of the definition to include broad-
band service on a wider scale. Furthermore, to the
extent that common carrier and public utility reg-
ulation for the benefit of the general public (not
just disadvantaged individuals or communities) is
viewed as an early form of welfare state regula-
112 See generally Cherry Telecomm Address, supra note 71.
tion,' 12 welfare rights of individuals and commu-
nities under the first two broadband access issues
would also be adversely affected.
For both the third and fifth issues, the free
speech rights of individuals as citizens of a democ-
racy could be adversely impacted. This is because,
as to both issues, government's failure to require
interconnection with competitive ISPs or among
broadband networks could undermine its interest
in facilitating viewpoint diversity for American cit-
izens. Furthermore, failure to require intercon-
nection could also adversely affect the speech
rights of individuals and competitive ISPs in their
status as speakers. In this way, as will be discussed
in Section VI.D., the free speech rights of broad-
band network providers as corporations could be
permitted to trump those of natural persons as
citizens.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
INDIVIDUALS VERSUS CORPORATIONS
If access to broadband is deeied essential,
changes in regulation would be required to pre-
vent the adverse effects on intended access recipi-
ents summarized in Table 3. If the historical legal
principles mandating access to essential services
or facilities discussed in Section IV are invoked,
possible remedies for each of the five broadband
access issues, include: (1) imposing common car-
rier obligations on all broadband providers of the
physical layer; (2) imposing some duty to serve
(build-out) obligations on broadband providers,
which could vary among communities with the
possible inclusion of some financial relief to miti-
gate the financial burden; (3) compelling broad-
band providers to provide access to competitive
ISPs; (4) changing the method of recovering con-
tributions for the federal universal service support
mechanisms, such as including assessment against
telecommunications carriers' intrastate revenues,
or having funding come from general tax reve-
nues; and (5) requiring interconnection among
broadband networks at whatever layer is neces-
sary.
However, for any suggested remedy that im-
poses additional burdens on broadband access
providers, constitutional challenges will
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Table 3: Obstacles to Achieving "Essentiality of Access"
For Broadband Access Issues
Current or Pending Regula- Adverse Effect of Current Adversely Affected Rights of
Broadband Issue tion Regulation Access Recipients
1. Enduser access to physical Government may impose Erosion of common carrier Economic (and welfare)*
infrastructure of broadband intramodal asymmetric regu- regulation for narrowband rights of individuals as
network. lation of telecommunications physical layer, and potential endusers of narrowband and
carriers' narrowband and unavailability of access to broadband access.
broadband physical layers. broadband physical layer.
2. Physical and/or logical Government imposes no Some communities, or por- Economic (and welfare)*
infrastructures of broadband affirmative duty to serve tions thereof, may not have rights of communities of
network need to be ubiqui- communities, or portions access to broadband physical individuals as endusers of
tously available throughout thereof, with broadband infrastructure, broadband access.
the community. physical layer.
3. Access to the physical Government imposes no Goal of viewpoint diversity Free speech rights of individ-
layer, through interconnec- obligation on cable modem could be undermined. uals as citizens of democracy
tion at the logical layer, for access providers to provide (reflected in government
ISP's who are competitors at access to competitive ISP's. interest in viewpoint diver-
the logical layer. BOC's may not have to sity) and possibly also as
unbundle transmission corn- speakers.
ponent of broadband ser-
vice.
4. Access to physical, and Existing funding burden of Unsustainability of federal Welfare rights of intended
possibly logical, infrastruc- federal universal service sup- universal service support beneficiaries.
ture of broadband service port for Internet access to mechanisms, and therefore
within definition of universal eligible schools and libraries unavailability of reasonably
service. and rural health care provid- priced broadband service.
ers is large. Funding burden
would increase if support is
expanded for broadband ser-
vices to individuals.
5. Interconnection among Government may not impose Goal of viewpoint diversity Free speech rights of:
broadband networks, necessary interconnection could be undermined. (a) individuals as citizens of
requirements among broad- democracy (reflected in gov-
band networks, ernment interest in view-
point diversity) and possibly
also as speakers; and
(b) competitors as speakers.
* Welfare rights would also be applicable if one considers common carrier and public utility regulation to be an early form of welfare
state regulation. See note 72, supra.
emerge.'3 To address the effects on their eco-
nomic interests, the most likely challenges will be
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 14
Constitutional challenges by broadband access
providers will require the courts to weigh the
competing interests of broadband providers and
113 In fact, constitutional challenges are more likely to
arise when government responds to change in communica-
tions technology by transitions from monopoly-based to der-
egulatory policies. See Cherry & Wildman 2000, supra note 12,
at 66-93.
114 Challenges may also be brought under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which pro-
vides that no state shall "deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, §1. Such claims would be based on allegations of uncon-
access recipients. This will pose difficulties for the
courts in conducting the necessary constitutional
analyses. Some difficulties will arise from the need
to address conflicts in the differing legal regimes
among now-competing technology platforms.
However, this section discusses difficulties that ap-
pear to have been previously unraised in broad-
band policy debates. More specifically, the consti-
stitutional disparate treatment of a regulation among broad-
band providers. However, the Equal Protection Clause is not
discussed here for two reasons. First, the distinction in con-
stitutional rights of natural persons and corporations will
most likely arise in disputes between access recipients and ac-
cess providers, not in disputes among broadband access prov-
iders. Second, the same jurisprudence applies for determin-
ing corporations' constitutional rights as "persons" under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See infra note 120, and accompanying text.
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tutionality of broadband regulation may depend
upon the characteristics of the corporate form of
broadband providers.
A. No Consistent Theory of Constitutional
Rights for Corporations
It is well established that corporations do have
constitutional rights but they are not coextensive
with those of individuals as natural persons.' '5 In
some instances, corporations have no constitu-
tional rights whatsoever. For example, a corpora-
tion is not a "citizen" protected by the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2116
or of the Fourteenth Amendment' 1 7 of the
United States Constitution, nor is it a "person"
with a right against self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendment." Yet, use of the phrase "citi-
zen" or "person" in the United States Constitution
is not definitive in determining a corporation's
115 See Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91
YALE L.J. 1641, 1644 (1982) (discussing the constitutional
rights of corporations as compared to natural persons)
[hereinafter Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person]; Peter
J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seek-
ing a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corpora-
tions in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1996) (dis-
cussing the constitutional rights of corporations as compared
to natural persons) [hereinafter Henning]; Larry E. Ribstein,
The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUPREME CT.
ECON. REV. 95 (1995) (discussing the constitutional rights of
corporations as compared to natural persons) [hereinafter
Ribstein].
11I Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868) (holding that
"Citizens" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Ar-
ticle IV, Section 2 applies only to natural persons; corpora-
tions are citizens only for the purpose of determining court
jurisdiction).
117 W. Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907)
(holding that "Citizens" under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include cor-
porations).
118 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is per-
sonal to the witness and cannot be invoked by a corporation
where the witness is an officer or employee).
I119 Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61 (1809) (hold-
ing that a corporation is not a citizen and cannot sue or be
sued in courts of the United States unless the rights of the
individual members can be exercised in their corporate
name).
121) County of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S.
394 (1886), is cited as the case that established this interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment even though no such
holding is contained in the Court's opinion. Dissenting opin-
ions in subsequent cases have illuminated the flaw of this at-
tribution. See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U.S. 77, 85-87 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing the
Slaughter House cases decided in 1873, in which the Court
rights. For example, individual citizens can sue or
be sued in their corporate name for purposes of
invoking the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts, lI., and a corporation has been considered
a "person" protected by the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 12"
However, the "[United States Supreme] Court
has never adopted a single test for applying con-
stitutional rights to corporations, at least in part
because it has never agreed upon a single under-
standing of what a corporation is for constitu-
tional purposes."12' In early cases, the Court
viewed the corporation as an artificial legal entity
with a distinct bundle of rights and obligations. 
2 2
Under this theory, "government's power to create
corporations also implies and assumes pervasive
government power to regulate corporations. This,
in turn, provides a basis for denigrating the con-
stitutional protection of corporate activities." 23 In
found that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed following
freedom of a race from slavery and applied only to natural
persons, and concluding that "the language of the amend-
ment itself does not support the theory that it was passed for
the benefit of corporations"); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glan-
der, 337 U.S. 562, 576-81 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting;
Black, J., concurring in the dissent) (asserting that a corpora-
tion as a "person" within the meaning of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not a holding
in the opinion in Santa Clara, but merely an assertion by then
Chief justice Waite from the bench during oral argument).
Nonetheless, the Santa Clara case is still cited, although im-
properly so, as having settled the issue that corporations are
persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
780 n.15 (1978); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional
Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression
and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO.
L.J. 1347, 1353-55 (1979) (stating that the Santa Clara deci-
sion is noted for holding that all constitutional guarantees
for individuals are applicable to corporations as well).
121 Henning, supra note 115, at 807.
122 Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
518, 636 (1819) (providing the most famous expression of
the corporation as an artificial legal entity, which is often re-
ferred to as the corporate person theory).
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence. These are
such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object
for which it was created. Among the most important are
immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, indi-
viduality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of
many persons are considered as the same, and may act as
a single individual. Id.
123 Ribstein, supra note 115, at 96.
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the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
the view of incorporation as a privilege granted by
the sovereign came into disfavor due to concerns
of monopoly and corruption. 12 4 "As access to cor-
porate status became a right of the many
[through State general incorporation statutes],
the corporation came to be regarded progres-
sively less as a creation of the sovereign and in-
creasingly more as a product of contractual agree-
ment."125 Under this view, the corporation is sim-
ply a device for referring to the summary of rights
and duties of the private parties who contractually
agreed to create it, and therefore should be af-
forded the same constitutional protections as nat-
ural persons. 126
The determination of corporate constitutional
rights does depend on the theory of the corpora-
tion that is used. Yet, the Court has never pro-
vided an overall unifying theory of the corpora-
tion to explain its holdings.127 Nonetheless, some
preliminary conclusions can be made regarding
likely constitutional challenges that will be
brought by broadband access providers. First,
treatment of claims related to takings of private
property for public use withoutjust compensation
will be independent of the corporate form. Sec-
ond, policy makers' views of necessary regulation
may depend on the unique attributes of the cor-
porate form, and the constitutionality of such reg-
ulation under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment will depend upon the charac-
teristics of the affected business. Third, address-
ing competing free speech rights between corpo-
rate broadband providers and natural persons will
likely be the most contested area. There is prece-
dent for restricting free speech rights of corpora-
tions to a greater extent than for natural per-
sons. 28 However, the extent to which greater re-
strictions can be placed on media-related corpora-
124 Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note
115, at 1647. This assertion refers to some of the problems
that resulted in the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act
and the Sherman Act, as discussed supra Sections IV.B.2 and
B.3.
125 Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, supra note
115, at 1647.
126 Id. at 1647-48. See also Ribstein, supra note 115, at 96.
127 See supra note 115. In each of these articles, the au-
thor offers his own theory or model for viewing the corpora-
tion in the twentieth century.
128 See Ribstein, supra note 115, at 124-38 (discussing the
justifications for restricting speech more so for corporations
than for natural persons).
129 The Takings Clause provides in relevant part: "nor
tions is unclear. Addressing conflicts in free
speech interests among broadband providers and
natural persons (as the intended access recipients
of broadband policies) will likely be the most
compelling and complex challenge for policy
makers and the courts.
B. Takings of Private Property: Constitutional
Rights Independent of Corporate Form
One of the most fundamental limits on actions
by the federal and state governments is that gov-
ernment may not take private property for public
use without providing just compensation. This
prohibition applies to the federal government
under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, 129 and to
the state governments under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 30 This
prohibition protects the owners of private prop-
erty, regardless of the form by which the owners
may be organized. Valid takings claims arise not
only when government exercises its eminent do-
main power to take real property, but also when
exercise of its regulatory powers is considered
confiscatory. Classic examples of the latter are
public utility cases in which the financial viability
of the utility is threatened by requirements of
state and/or federal regulatory requirements.' 31
More recent examples are cases regarding physi-
cal collocation requirements imposed on incum-
bent local exchange companies. 32
The imposition of historical legal principles for
mandating access to essential services or facilities
discussed in Section IV to the second (access for
communities of individual end users), third (ac-
cess for competitors) and fifth (access by speaker
as end user or competitor) broadband issues dis-
cussed in Section V could generate takings claims
shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See also Cherry &
Wildman 2000, supra note 12, at 69-74 (discussing the appli-
cability of the Takings Clause to communications policies).
130 Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417
(1896); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
238-39, 241 (1897). See also infra note 135 and accompanying
text (discussing the Due Process Clause).
' ' See Cherry & Wildman 2000, supra note 12, at 72-74.
132 See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1447 (D.C.
Cir. 1994) (finding the FCC order of physical collocation to
be a physical taking of property under the Fifth Amend-
ment); GTE N.W. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Oregon, 900
P.2d 495, 506 (Or. 1995) (holding that the state commis-
sion's order of physical collocation constituted a taking).
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under certain circumstances. For example, impo-
sition of an affirmative duty to serve could be con-
fiscatory if the cost of providing broadband physi-
cal infrastructure far exceeds the price that cus-
tomers could reasonably pay.'- 3 A requirement to
provide access to facilities to competitors or to in-
terconnect with other broadband providers could
be confiscatory if reasonable compensation is not
required to be paid to cover relevant costs. Failure
to provide for compensation was a main defect of
the physical collocation cases.'3a4 Consideration of
confiscation claims under such circumstances
would not be a function of whether or not the af-
fected broadband provider was a corporation.
C. Due Process Affecting Private Property
Rights: Policy Rationale Affected by
Corporate Form
Aside from takings claims, a corporation's prop-
erty interests are further protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides that no State shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."'1 35 Economic regulation under a
State's police power must be consistent with due
process.
As discussed in Sections IV.B.2 and B.3, Con-
gress passed the Interstate Commerce Act and the
Sherman Act to expressly address economic
abuses that it attributed to the development of the
modern corporation. Historically, the corporate
form has been relevant to legislators' views of ap-
propriate economic regulation.
Furthermore, the scope of permissible eco-
nomic regulation for a given business depends on
the specific circumstances in each case. There is a
well-established line of cases that upholds a
greater degree of regulation for businesses bear-
ing certain characteristics, commonly referred to
133 Takings claims in this context would be similar to
those that have been raised at times by public utilities. See
Cherry & Wildman 2000, supra note 12.
134 See id. at 132 and Cherry & Wildman 2000, supra note
12, at 102.
1'5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. However, the applicabil-
ity of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the property interests of corpora-
tions is not withotIt controversy. See THOM HARTMANN, UNE-
QUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE AND
THE THEFT OF HUMAN RiR;iIS (2002). In any event, protec-
tion of liberty under the Due Process Clause applies only to
natural, not artificial, persons. W Turf Ass'n v Greenburg, 204
as "businesses affected with a public interest." It is
under this body of law that obligations imposed
on common carriers and public utilities have
been upheld. For such businesses, regulation to
protect the public interest is justified to address
various forms of economic coercion.
As for the legal principles affecting economic
interests in Section IV, it appears that the corpo-
rate form of the broadband providers may be rele-
vant to policy makers' decisions of what obliga-
tions to impose. The greater the abuses associated
with the corporate form, the greater the justifica-
tion for economic regulation. Furthermore, so
long as broadband providers bear characteristics
similar to those of "businesses affected with a pub-
lic interest," 13 6 application of these legal princi-
ples for the benefit of end users should not pose
any problems under the Due Process Clause. The
legal obligations to deal with competitors could
also be deemed consistent with interpretation of
the Sherman Act.
D. Free Speech Rights: Constitutional Rights
Affected by Corporate Form
As discussed in Section IV.D, the courts recog-
nize the dual role of the First Amendment in pro-
tecting the interests of individuals and helping to
sustain a democracy. 137 Recognizing this dual
role, in some cases, the courts have upheld gov-
ernmentally-imposed access requirements on
electronic mass media in furtherance of viewpoint
diversity even though it would limit the medium
owner's First Amendment rights.'38
The jurisprudence in this area is very complex
for various reasons.139 First, the level of judicial
scrutiny applied to regulation affecting the
speech rights of the mass media differs among
technology platforms. 14 In other words, a given
regulation may be constitutional for one technol-
U.S. 359, 363 (1907).
1-36 For the purposes of discussion in Section V, it is as-
sumed that broadband providers did bear similar characteris-
tics to "businesses affected with a public interest."
37 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
13$8 See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
139 See generally BOTEIN, supra note 81 (discussing free
speech jurisprudence as applied to electronic mass media);
THOM BARTON CARTER, MARC A. FRANKLIN, J. WRIGHT, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THiE FOURTH ESTATE (8th ed. 2001)
(discussing free speech jurisprudence as applied to elec-
tronic mass media).
1411 See supra note 87.
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ogy platform, but not for another. Secondly, the
jurisprudence for any given technology platform
is uncertain. For example, the traditional justifica-
tion for a lower level ofjudicial scrutiny for broad-
casting-spectrum scarcity-no longer seems ap-
propriate.' 4 1 In addition, the United States Su-
preme Court has refused to unambiguously state
the First Amendment status of cable compa-
nies, 142 only able to reach its decision in Turner II
(must carry requirements) by plurality.143 Third,
convergence among technology platforms only
serves to heighten the complexity of applying First
Amendment analysis to the media. The conver-
gence between telecommunications carriers as
non-speakers with the electronic mass media as
speakers is an example, as discussed in Section
IV.D.
Today, the need to address the First Amend-
ment status of competing communications tech-
nology platforms is receiving much attention.
Many recent articles have focused on the free
speech rights among information infrastructure
providers.'
44
The discussion as to the third (access for com-
petitors) and fifth (access by speaker as end user
or competitor) broadband issues in Section V also
illustrates the great potential for regulation to
cause conflicting free speech interests between ac-
cess recipients and broadband providers. To date,
analyses regarding conflicting free speech rights
of access recipients and broadband providers
have primarily focused on open access require-
ments as applied to cable broadband service prov-
141 See Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licens
ing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 990 (1989). Furthermore,
changing views of spectrum scarcity is shifting the regulatory
regime for spectrum allocation from administrative hearings
to auctions. See FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER, A PROPOSAL FOR A
RAPID TRANSITION TO MARKET ALLOCATION OF SPECTRUM, (au-
thored by Evan Kwerel and John Williams), 38 FCC Rcd. 16-
24 (2002).
142 See supra note 87.
143 See supra note 83.
144 See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the National
Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 51 (1995);
Andrew D. Auerbach, Mandatory Access and the Information In-
frastructure, 3 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 1 (1994); Note, The Mes-
sage in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Su-
perhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062 (1994).
145 See, e.g., David Wolitz, Open Access and the First Amend-
ment: A Critique of Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v.
Broward County, 4 YALE SYMP. L. & TECHN. 6 (2001) (arguing
that open access regulation of cable operators to allow all
ISPs to lease bandwidth on cable lines at nondiscriminatory
rates is consistent with the Free Speech Clause of the First
iders. 145
However, no attention has been given to the
relevance of the corporate form as a factor in ad-
dressing the constitutionality of government re-
strictions on free speech rights. Yet, the need to
resolve conflicts among free speech interests of in-
tended access recipients and access providers will
often require evaluation of their constitutional
rights as natural persons and corporations, re-
spectively.
There is precedent for restricting the free
speech rights of corporations to a greater extent
than natural persons for reasons directly related
to unique characteristics of the corporate form. 146
Political speech, unlike commercial speech, re-
ceives the highest level of First Amendment pro-
tection. 14 7 Nevertheless, in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce,14s the United States Su-
preme Court upheld a Michigan statute that pro-
hibited certain corporations from using corporate
treasury funds for independent expenditures in
support or opposition of candidates in state elec-
tions. 149 The Court found that this restriction on
corporations' political speech was justified be-
cause the State had a compelling interest in
preventing a specific type of corruption in the po-
litical arena: "the corrosive and distorting effects
of immense aggregations of wealth that are accu-
mulated with the help of the corporate form and
that have little or no correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas."'1
50
The Court held that the Michigan legislature had
identified a serious danger that "corporate politi-
Amendment under an intermediate scrutiny test); Harold
Feld, Whose Line is it Anyway? The First Amendment and Cable
Open Access, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 23 (2000) (arguing that
Internet access through cable providers should be treated as
a common carrier service from a First Amendment point of
view).
146 See supra note 115.
147 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (creating the
commercial speech doctrine). See Ribstein, supra note 115, at
124-29 (discussing the differing levels of First Amendment
protection for political and commercial speech).
148 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
149 Id. at 668-69.
150 Id. at 660. The statute applied only to independent
expenditures from corporate treasuries for which the means
of amassing the funds had little correlation to the public's
support for the corporation's political ideas. Corporations
could make expenditures through separate segregated funds
where contributions are made by people based on the under-
standing that the funds would be used solely for political pur-
poses. Id. at 659-60.
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cal expenditures will undermine the integrity of
the political process."' 5 1 Therefore, because the
government had a compelling interest in prevent-
ing the erosion of the political process, the court
ruled that the prohibition was warranted. As the
court stated, "the unique state-conferred corpo-
rate structure that facilitates the amassing of large
treasuries warrants the limit on independent ex-
penditures." 152
In Austin the statute did exempt media corpora-
tions from the expenditure restriction.15" The
Court upheld this exemption under the Equal
Protection Clause because "[a] valid distinction
.. . exists between corporations that are part of
the media industry and other corporations that
are not involved in the regular business of im-
parting news to the public."'15 4 However, the
Court further stated: "[A] lthough the press' unique
societal role may not entitle the press to greater protection
under the Constitution, it does provide a compelling
reason for the State to exempt media corpora-
tions from the scope of political expenditure limi-
tations."' 5 By this statement, the Court implied
that placing the same restrictions on the press-
the form of mass media with the highest level of
First Amendment protection-may be constitu-
tional. Although clearly not definitive, the Court's
opinion reflects that the Court may be open to
placing limitations on the free speech rights of
mass media providers for reasons related to char-
acteristics unique to the corporate form.
Thus, Austin does support the possibility of al-
lowing the government to place restrictions on
broadband access providers' free speech rights for
reasons related to characteristics unique to corpo-
rations. A compelling governmental interest
could be viewpoint diversity, as discussed with re-
gard to the third (access by competitors) and fifth
(access by speaker as end user or competitor)
broadband access issues in Section V. This would
present conflicts between the free speech rights of
access recipients and broadband providers. In bal-
ancing the interests of the access recipients and
access providers, a justification for imposing re-
strictions on the providers' free speech rights
could be the various forms of economic coercion
discussed under the first three (access by individ-
151 Id. at 668.
152 Id. at 660.
153 Id. at 667-87.
154 Id. at 668.
ual end users, communities of individual end
users or competitors) broadband issues discussed
in Section V. The economic abuses of media cor-
porations could be considered particularly acute
given their corporate form, much as Congress
found for railroads and large industrial enter-
prises when it enacted the Interstate Commerce
Act and the Sherman Act.'
15
CONCLUSION
In various contexts the government has inter-
vened to ensure that essential services and facili-
ties are provided to the public. The legal princi-
ples employed have varied with the type of access
problem-what services or facilities are deemed
to be essential, for whom they are deemed essen-
tial, the nature of the relationship between the in-
tended access recipient and the access provider,
and the circumstances impeding the accessibility
of the service or facilities. The mapping of access
situations bearing similar characteristics to the
historical legal principles applied to them is re-
ferred to here as an "essentiality of access" typol-
ogy. "Essentiality of access" is a valuable organiz-
ing principle for evaluating future public policy
objectives affecting the technologically converg-
ing communications industries, because policy
problems that have been previously handled by
distinct legal rules for any given technology must
now be addressed simultaneously across compet-
ing technology platforms.
Applying "essentiality of access" typology to cur-
rent broadband access issues demonstrates how
pursuit of broadband policy objectives requires
recognizing the various relationships between ac-
cess recipients and the access providers that affect
different categories of legal rights: economic, wel-
fare and free speech rights. Different categories of
rights implicate different legal principles, which,
at times, may conflict. This requires policy makers
to choose some interests over others. Further-
more, pursuit of multiple broadband access objec-
tives makes the selection of appropriate govern-
ment interventions a tremendously complex en-
deavor.
"Essentiality of access" analysis shows that if
155 Id. at 668 (emphasis added) (internal citations omit-
ted).
156 See supra Sections IV.B.2 and B.3.
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broadband should later be considered an essen-
tial service or facility, current or pending policy
actions affecting broadband could create adverse
effects for the economic, welfare and free speech
rights of intended access recipients. For example,
lack of a common carriage requirement on cable
modem access and wireline broadband Internet
access providers could adversely affect the availa-
bility of broadband and narrowband services at
reasonable rates. Lack of an affirmative duty to
serve communities with broadband infrastructure
could leave some areas without any broadband ac-
cess. In addition, lack of a requirement on broad-
band providers to share their physical infrastruc-
ture with competitive ISPs, or the lack of intercon-
nection requirements among broadband physical
or logical infrastructures, could diminish view-
point diversity-a longstanding government inter-
est.
"Essentiality of access" analysis also shows that
there is an even more fundamental challenge for
policymakers and the courts. The constitutionality
of broadband policies-such as under the Due
Process Clause or free speech under the First
Amendment-may depend on characteristics of
broadband providers that are unique to the cor-
porate form. It has long been established that the
legal rights and duties of individuals and corpora-
tions are not synonymous under United States
law, and that the government has created legal
principles to specifically address abuses of power
by corporations. The courts will need to clarify
the principles for determining the constitutional
rights of corporations under the United States
Constitution in order to address the constitu-
tional challenges that new broadband policies will
likely engender.
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